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Abstract
Most juridical systems contain the principle that an act is only unlaw-
ful if the agent conducting the act has a `guilty mind' (`mens rea'). Dif-
ferent law systems distinguish diﬀerent modes of mens rea. For instance,
American law distinguishes between `knowingly' performing a criminal
act, `recklessness', `strict liability', etc. I will show we can formalize several
of these categories. The formalism I use is a complete stit-logic featuring
operators for stit-actions taking eﬀect in `next' states, S5-knowledge op-
erators and SDL-type obligation operators. The diﬀerent modes of `mens
rea' correspond to the violation conditions of diﬀerent types of obligation
deﬁnable in the logic.
1 Introduction
An important distinction in law is the one between `actus reus', which translates
to `guilty act', and `mens rea' for `guilty mind'. It is a general principle of law
that both these conditions should be met for an act to qualify as criminal, that
is, guilt not only presupposes a forbidden act as such, also, the performing
agent must have committed the act knowingly, intentionally, purposely, etc.1.
The task of showing that both necessary conditions `actus reus' and `mens rea'
apply to an alleged criminal act, is in law referred to as `showing concurrence'.
There are diﬀerent levels of mens rea, each corresponding to diﬀerent levels of
culpability. And, of course, diﬀerent law systems have diﬀerent categories. The
current North American system works with the following modes, in decreasing
order of culpability (as taken from [18]):
• Purposefully - the actor has the "conscious object" of engaging in con-
duct and believes and hopes that the attendant circumstances exist.
• Knowingly - the actor is certain that his conduct will lead to the result.
1The general principle was already formulated back in 1797, by the English jurist Edward
Coke: "actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea", which is Latin for "an act does not make
somebody guilty unless his/her mind is also guilty"
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• Recklessly - the actor is aware that the attendant circumstances exist,
but nevertheless engages in the conduct that a "law-abiding person" would
have refrained from.
• Negligently - the actor is unaware of the attendant circumstances and
the consequences of his conduct, but a "reasonable person" would have
been aware
• Strict liability - the actor engaged in conduct and his mental state is
irrelevant
The ﬁrst class, the one of acts committed purposefully, is about acts that
are instrumental in reaching an agent's malicious goal. The second class is not
directly about an agent's intentions, aims or goals, but only about the condition
whether or not an agent knows what it is doing. The third class is a little less
clear. I think it is defendable to interpret it as the category of acts where
an agent knowingly risks an unlawful outcome. For the fourth category, not
knowing the (possible, or necessary - that is not made explicit) outcomes is
not an excuse: if the agent did not know, it simply should have known. The
ﬁnal category concerns the complete absence of `mens rea'. This is the category
where agents can be culpable without having a `guilty mind' whatsoever.
I claim the levels of culpability correspond to (1) levels of excusability and
(2) levels of deontic strength. For the ﬁrst class, the deontic strength is lowest of
all and several excuses apply. In particular, for this class an `actus reus' can be
accompanied by the valid excuses: "I did not have bad intentions", "I did not
know what I was doing", etc, etc. For the second category, deontic strength is
higher, and less excuses apply. In particular, the excuse that there were no bad
intentions is no longer acceptable. What counts is that the agent knew what it
was doing, irrespective of the goal the act was aimed at. For the third category,
where the deontic strength is yet higher, it is not even an excuse that the agent
was not sure about the outcome: the agent is liable simply because it takes
the risk the outcome is unlawful. In the fourth category, the excuse that the
agent, "stupid enough", did not realize the consequences of his act, is no longer
valid: for violations of any prohibition in this category he is still liable, because
any `reasonable' agent would have foreseen the consequences. And ﬁnally, for
the strict liability category, deontic strength is highest of all, and no excuses
referring to the mental state of an agent apply at all.
In philosophy, the idea that excuses play an important role in distinguishing
diﬀerent modes of acting was put forward by Austin [5]. And many other kinds
of excuses than the ones above are thinkable. For instance, among the most
well-known excuses for violating an obligation are: "I was not able to", "I
do not agree my act counts-as a violation", "I obeyed a stronger, conﬂicting
obligation" and "I did not know I had to". Of these, in this paper, I will only
consider the ﬁrst and the last one. The ﬁrst one, about not being able to comply
to the obligation, is only a valid excuse if the principle of "ought implies can"
applies. The last one, concerning knowledge of the condition that the act is
obliged, refers directly to the juridical principle "ignorantia juris non excusat",
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which translates to "ignorance of or mistake about the law is no defence". So,
here the (absence of) excuse is not so much about the mode of acting, as in
the modes of mens rea above, but about whether or not the agent knows about
the `deontic status' of the act. This maybe subtle diﬀerence with the described
modes of mens rea is not made very clear in the juridical literature. But, in our
formalizations it will be.
We will also look at how we can formally deﬁne what counts as a `reus actus'.
Also for this, the juridical literature gives exact deﬁnitions. In particular, a reus
actus cannot be an involuntary act. For instance, a person being thrown of a
high building, surviving his fall by crashing into another person, who gets killed
as the result of functioning as a cushion, has not committed an actus reus,
even though the falling person knew that he actually was crashing into the
person. The current American Model Penal Code [18] lists what acts count as
involuntary acts for which no agent can be liable.
• a reﬂex or convulsion
• a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep
• conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic suggestion
• a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the eﬀort or the
determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual
In this paper we will formalize (1) the diﬀerent modes of mens rea with the
exception of the ﬁrst category concerning `purposefully' acts, (2) diﬀerent modes
of reus actus, that is, voluntary acts (3) the condition of "ignorantia juris non
excusat". The mens rea class of `purposefully' acts is not considered because I
do not consider goals and intentions; I leave this for future research. Almost all
the other categories concern conditions referring to an agent's knowledge about
his actions. And knowledge operators will be a central concern of this paper.
More in particular, we will come up with many diﬀerent notions of obligation
(as is common in deontic logic, we will treat obligations and prohibitions on a
par, and see prohibitions as obligations to act oppositely), many of which can
be associated with one of the classes of mens rea. The formal framework is
also very well suited to reﬁne and disambiguate the classes from the juridical
literature.
This paper builds up the formal framework in three stages. First, in section
2, for the formalization of the acts as such, we deﬁne a stit-logic. Our stit-
logic will be diﬀerent from any stit-logic in the literature (with the exception
of the earlier versions in [11] and [12]) in the sense that eﬀects occur in `next'
states. In this section we make a start with our investigation of the modes of
acting from the juridical literature by showing how to capture aspects of the
`voluntariness' requirement for an actus reus. Then, in section 3, we add an
epistemic dimension to the logic, which will enable us to express the notion of
`knowingly doing'. This will enable us to be precise about the epistemic aspects
of an actus reus. Then, third, in section 4 the deontic operators are introduced.
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In this section we deﬁne the diﬀerent types of obligation that correspond to
diﬀerent modes of mens rea.
2 A stit-logic aﬀecting `next' states: XSTIT
In this section we deﬁne a complete stit-logic where actions take eﬀect in `next'
states: XSTIT. The logic XSTIT was ﬁrst investigated in [11]. We also used the
almost identical name `X-STIT' in [13], but there the `X' is separated from the
acronym `STIT', which refers to the fact that that paper's classical instantaneous
stit logic is extended with a next operator, while in the present stit-variant
eﬀectivity of stit-operators itself refers to next states. That is not the only
diﬀerence with the stit-logic(s) in [13]. In particular, the present logic drops
some of the axioms in [13], adds several new ones, and is complete. Also we use
a two dimensional semantics, closer to the stit-semantics in the philosophical
literature.
The most distinguishing feature of the present stit-logic is that actions only
take eﬀect in `next' states, where `next' refers to immediate successors of the
present state. This distinguishes the logic not only from the stit-variant in [13],
but also from any stit-logic in the (philosophical) literature. However, there are
very good reasons for taking this approach. The ﬁrst reason is that the logics
of the multi-agent versions of, what we might call, the standard `instantaneous'
stit, are undecidable and not ﬁnitely axiomatizable [6, 21]. The second reason
is that the view that actions only take eﬀect in some immediate next state, is
the standard view in formal models of computation in computer science. And
ﬁnally, also from a philosophical perspective, the choice can be advocated. Given
that acting always seems associated with some eﬀort or process, and given that
these take time, we may conclude that actions take place `in' time.
Besides the usual propositional connectives, the syntax of XSTIT comprises
an operator ϕ for historical necessity, which plays the same role as the well-
known path quantiﬁers in logics such as CTL and CTL∗ [19], and an operator
[A xstit]ϕ for `agents A jointly see to it that ϕ in the next state'. Given a
countable set of propositions P and a ﬁnite set Ags of agent names, formally
the language can be described as:
Deﬁnition 2.1 Given a countable set of propositions P and p ∈ P , and given
a ﬁnite set Ags of agent names, and A ⊆ Ags, the formal language LXSTIT is:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | [A xstit]ϕ
We deﬁne the temporal `next' operator as the action performed by the com-
plete set of agents Ags, leading to a unique follow-up state:
Deﬁnition 2.2
Xϕ ≡def [Ags xstit]ϕ
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The view that the complete set of agents uniquely determines the next state
is a common one. Not only it can be found in the multi-agent stit-logics in
the philosophical literature [23], but also in related computer science formalisms
such as Alternating Time Temporal Logic (ATL) [1, 2]. For the relation between
stit-formalisms and ATL and Coalition Logic (CL) [28], see [14, 15].
Note that our stit-operator concerns, what game-theorists call, `one-shot'
actions. We can also imagine to have a strategic stit-operator (see [16]) where
it is assumed that groups of agent have multiple subsequent choice points to
ensure a certain condition (game theorist call these `extensive games'). In my
opinion, temporal operators other than the next operator make less sense for a
stit-logic that is about one-shot actions. So, I am not in favor of, for instance,
Horty's choice [23] to have a `some time in the future' temporal operator in a
non-strategic stit-setting. Ensuring a condition `some time in the future' seems
to me intrinsically strategic, and not often something that can be accomplished
by a one-shot action. Interestingly enough, none of the one-shot stit-logics in
the philosophical literature has a next operator, while from my point of view
the next is actually the single most intuitive temporal operator to be considered
in these logics.
In the description of the models, below, we will use terminology inspired
by similar terminology from Coalition Logic, and call the relations interpreting
the stit-operator `eﬀectivity' relations. However, our eﬀectivity relations are not
just the relational equivalent of the eﬀectivity functions of CL. Our eﬀectivity
relations are relative to histories and determine the possible outcomes modulo
the history. Eﬀectivity functions in CL are relative to a state, and yield sets of
possible outcomes.
Deﬁnition 2.3 An XSTIT-frame is a tuple 〈S,H,R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}〉 such
that:
• S is a non-empty set of states. Elements of S are denoted s, s′, etc.
• H is a non-empty set of histories. Histories are sets of states. Elements
of H are denoted h, h′, etc.
• Structured worlds are tuples 〈s, h〉, with s ∈ S and h ∈ H and s ∈ h.
• R is a `historical necessity' relation over structured worlds such that
〈h, s〉R〈h′, s′〉 if and only if s = s′
• The RA are `eﬀectivity' relations over structured worlds such that:
 RAgs is a `next time' relation such that if 〈h, s〉RAgs〈h′, s′〉 then h =
h′, and RAgs is serial and deterministic (the next state is completely
determined by the choice made by the complete set of agents). So,
histories `contain' linearly ordered sets of states.
 RA ⊆ RB for B ⊂ A (super-groups are at least as eﬀective; in partic-
ular, eﬀectivity for the empty `group' and possibility for the complete
group are inherited by all groups)
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 R ◦ RAgs ⊆ R∅ (`empty-group' eﬀectivity implies system unavoid-
ability / settledness)
 RA ⊆ R◦RAgs for any A (an action undertaken by A in the present
state ensures the next state is element of a speciﬁc subset of all pos-
sible next states)
 RAgs ◦ R ⊆ RA for any A (no actions constitute a choice between
histories that are undivided in next states)
 if 〈h, s〉R〈h′, s〉 and 〈h, s〉R〈h′′, s〉 then there is a 〈h, s〉R〈h′′′, s〉
such that for A∩B = ∅, if 〈h′′′, s〉RA〈h′′′′, s′〉 then 〈h′, s〉RA〈h′′′′, s′〉
and if 〈h′′′, s〉RB〈h′′′′′, s′′〉 then 〈h′′, s〉RB〈h′′′′′, s′′〉 (independence of
group agency)
The independence of agency condition above seem quite involved. The ax-
iomatic correspondent in deﬁnition 2.6 is more clear. Mainly, what is expressed,
is that possible eﬀectivity sets of diﬀerent agents have a non-empty intersection.
Deﬁnition 2.4 A frame F = 〈S,H,R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}〉 is extended to a
model M = 〈S,H,R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}, pi〉 by adding a valuation pi of atomic
propositions:
• pi is a valuation function pi : P −→ 2S×H assigning to each atomic propo-
sition the set of history/state pairs in which they are true.
The truth conditions for the semantics of the operators are standard. The
non-standard aspect is the multi-dimensionality of the semantics. Note how-
ever that our logic is not a product logic [20], because the dimensions are not
commutative.
Deﬁnition 2.5 Validity M, 〈s, h〉 |= ϕ, of a formula ϕ in a history/state pair
〈s, h〉 of a modelM = 〈S,H,R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}, pi〉 is deﬁned as:
M, 〈s, h〉 |= p ⇔ 〈s, h〉 ∈ pi(p)
M, 〈s, h〉 |= ¬ϕ ⇔ notM, 〈s, h〉 |= ϕ
M, 〈s, h〉 |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⇔ M, 〈s, h〉 |= ϕ andM, 〈s, h〉 |= ψ
M, 〈s, h〉 |= ϕ ⇔ 〈s, h〉R〈s′, h′〉 implies thatM, 〈s′, h′〉 |= ϕ
M, 〈s, h〉 |= [A xstit]ϕ ⇔ 〈s, h〉RA〈s′, h′〉 implies thatM, 〈s′, h′〉 |= ϕ
Satisﬁability, validity on a frame and general validity are deﬁned as usual.
While the semantics is standard from a (two-dimensional) modal logic per-
spective, the relation with standard stit-semantics deserves some explanation. In
the conditions on the frames we recognize standard stit properties like `no choice
between undivided histories' and properties that are speciﬁc for the present stit-
version, like `actions take eﬀect in successor states'. Actually, the frames can
easily be pictured as trees where histories branch in states, like in standard
stit-theory. The main diﬀerence is that states are not partitioned into choice
sets. The choice sets appear here (implicitly) as sets of possible next states (like
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in Coalition Logic). From a given `actual' history/state pair, we reach these
choice sets by ﬁrst jumping (along R) to another history through the same
state, and then looking (along RA) what next states are reachable through the
choice made by agents on that history.
One aspect of the present semantics needs extra clariﬁcation. Like in stan-
dard stit-semantics, history/state pairs for the same state can have diﬀerent
valuations of atomic propositions. In standard stit-formalisms this is actually
needed to give semantics to the instantaneous eﬀects of actions. But here, as
said, the eﬀects are not instantaneous. Therefore, in the present logic, the fact
that diﬀerent histories through the same state can have diﬀerent valuations of
non-temporal propositions, does not carry much meaning. Of course, in the
logic we can talk about atomic propositions being true or not in other histories
through the same state. For instance, the formula "p" expresses that all the
histories through the present state have in common that the atomic proposition
p holds on them. But the point is that one might think that actually we should
impose on the models that all histories through a state come with identical val-
uations of atomic propositions. That would induce the property ϕ → ϕ for
ϕ any `stit-operator-free' formula (in [13] we gave a system involving such an
axiom). However, this would complicate establishing a completeness result, and
does not strengthen the logic in any essential or interesting way. We think there
is no need at all to impose such a condition. Since actions only take eﬀect in next
states, alternative valuations for atomic propositions on other histories through
the same state are just not relevant for the semantics of the stit-fragment of our
logic.
Now we go on to the axiomatization of the logic. Actually, axiomatization
is fairly easy. The approach we have taken for constructing this logic is to build
up the semantic conditions on frames and the corresponding axiom schemes
simultaneously, while staying within the Sahlqvist class. This ensures that the
semantics cannot give rise to more logical principles than can be proven from
the axiomatization.
Deﬁnition 2.6 The following axiom schemas, in combination with a standard
axiomatization for propositional logic, and the standard rules (like necessitation)
for the normal modal operators, deﬁne a Hilbert system for XSTIT:
S5 for 
KD for each [A xstit]
(Det) ¬X¬ϕ→ Xϕ
(C-Mon) [A xstit]ϕ→ [A ∪B xstit]ϕ
(∅ ⇒Sett) [∅ xstit]ϕ→ Xϕ
(X-Eﬀ) Xϕ→ [A xstit]ϕ
(NCUH) [A xstit]ϕ→ Xϕ
(Indep-G) ♦[A xstit]ϕ ∧ ♦[B xstit]ψ → ♦([A xstit]ϕ ∧ [B xstit]ψ) for A ∩B = ∅
Theorem 2.1 The Hilbert system of deﬁnition 2.6 is complete with respect to
the semantics of deﬁnition 2.5.
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Proof The axioms correspond one-to-one to the semantic conditions deﬁned
on the frames (which can be easily veriﬁed with the on-line SQEMA system
[17]), and are all within the Sahlqvist class. This means that all the axioms
are expressible as ﬁrst-order conditions on frames and that together they are
complete with respect to the deﬁned frame classes, cf. [9, Th.2.42].
As part of the above axiomatization, we recognize Ming Xu's axiomatization
for multi-agent stit-logics (see the article in [8]). Xu's axiomatization is for the
standard, instantaneous stit-variant. The present stit-logic is diﬀerent in two
respects: (1) in the present logic, actions take eﬀect in next states, and (2) the
present logic is about groups of agents, while Xu's stit only considers individual
agents. But, it should not come as a surprise that the same axioms apply to the
present logic. The central property in Xu's axiomatization is the `independence
of agency' property. But the issue of independence of choices of diﬀerent agents
does not depend on the condition that eﬀects are instantaneous or occur in next
states.
Pauly's Coalition logic [28] is a logic of ability that is very closely related to
stit-formalisms. In particular, in [14] it is shown that Coalition Logic can be
embedded in stit-logic. Since in Coalition Logic actions also take eﬀect in next
states, restricting the stit-formalism by only allowing eﬀects in next state, as in
the logic of this paper, does not inhibit deﬁnability of Coalition Logic.
Theorem 2.2 Coalition Logic, whose central operator is [A]ϕ for `agents A
together can enforce ϕ', is embedded into the present logic by the deﬁnition
[A]ϕ := ♦[A xstit]ϕ (plus the obvious isomorphic translations for other connec-
tives).
Proof Proof strategies similar to those in [14] and [13] can be applied. First we
make sure that the axioms of coalition logic, after applying the above translation,
are valid for the present logic. Applying the above translation to the CL-axioms
from [28] yields:
(⊥) ¬♦[A xstit]⊥
(>) ♦[A xstit]>
(N) ¬♦([∅ xstit]¬ϕ→ ♦[Ags xstit]ϕ
(MON) ♦[A xstit](ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ♦[A xstit]ϕ
(S) ♦[A xstit]ϕ ∧ ♦[B xstit]ψ → ♦[A ∪B xstit](ϕ ∧ ψ) for A ∩B = ∅
It is quite straightforward to verify these properties for the present logic,
either semantically, or as theorems in the Hilbert system. (⊥) follows from KD
for [A xstit]. (>) follows from normalilty of the operators. (N) follows from
(X-Eﬀ), the truth axiom for , and propositional reasoning. (MON) follows
from the normality of the operators. (S) follows from (Indep-G) and normality
of [A xstit]. Furthermore, we have to verify that the two coalition logic rules
`modus ponens' and `logical equivalence' apply, but that is trivial, since both
rules are sound a fortiori for the present normal modal system.
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To complete the proof, we also have to show that the translation preserves
validity in the other direction. Or, equivalently, we check that it preserves sat-
isﬁability in the same direction. That is, given that a CL formula is satisﬁable
on a CL-model, we have to show that its translation is satisﬁable on the models
deﬁned in this paper. This is quite straightforward given the structural similar-
ities between CL-models and the models in this paper.
Recall that the (N) axiom of CL corresponds to `maximality' of Coalition
Logic eﬀectivity functions. Maximality of eﬀectivity functions is the key prop-
erty of so called `playable' eﬀectivity functions which Pauly proves to be equiv-
alent to game forms. In the translation to XSTIT, as given above, we get
¬♦([∅ xstit]¬ϕ → ♦[Ags xstit]ϕ. Now it turns out that this formula is not
in the Sahlqvist class. We can also write it as 〈Ags xstit〉ϕ → ♦[∅ xstit]ϕ,
where we recognize a variant on the well-known McKinsey property that is not
ﬁrst-order deﬁnable. But of course, it is very well possible that non-Sahlqvist
axioms are derivable as theorems in a Sahlqvist logic.
Finally in this section, as a proposition we list some theorems.
Proposition 2.3 The following are derivable in XSTIT:
(1) ♦[A xstit]ϕ→ ¬♦([A xstit]¬ϕ
(2) ♦[∅ xstit]ϕ↔ ¬♦([Ags xstit]¬ϕ
(3) [A xstit]ϕ ∧ [B xstit]ψ → [A ∪B xstit](ϕ ∧ ψ)
(4) Xϕ→ Xϕ
(5) [A xstit]ϕ→ Xϕ
(6) Xϕ↔ ¬X¬ϕ
(7) Xϕ↔ [∅ xstit]ϕ
Proof Derivation of all properties is just a little exercise in propositional normal
modal logic. In the ﬁrst property we recognize the `regularity' property of
Coalition Logic. It follows directly from (Indep-G).
Now, using XSTIT, we can already make a start with formalizing one of the
concepts deﬁned in the introduction. In particular, XSTIT will enable us to
consider the notion of `actus reus' more closely. As was explained, an actus
reus must be a voluntary act. Some aspects of the concept `voluntary' are
captured by the stit-notion of `deliberative action'. A deliberative stit-operator
adds an extra condition to the standard XSTIT-operator, to avoid the property
[A xstit]>. The idea is that agents should not be able to bring about things that
will be true inevitably, but only things that without their intervention might not
become true. We can easily deﬁne a deliberative version of the stit-operator, as
follows:
[A dxstit]ϕ ≡def [A xstit]ϕ ∧ ¬Xϕ
Theorem 2.4 The operator [A dxstit]ϕ, is a minimal (i.e., weak) modal oper-
ator, not obeying weakening, or agglomeration, but obeying D.
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Proof The ﬁrst part of the conjunction is KD and thus satisﬁes weakening,
but the second part not, because of the negation. Because of the negation, the
second part satisﬁes strengthening, but the ﬁrst part not. The ﬁrst part satisﬁes
agglomeration, but the second part not. Both parts satisfy the D-axiom.
So, deliberateness, as deﬁned in the operator above, seems to capture at least
part of what it means to act voluntarily: one could also have acted otherwise,
and thus one acts voluntarily. For instance, in the introduction, the crashing
into the person breaking the fall of the man thrown of the building is not a
voluntary act of the falling man, because the man had no choice but to fall,
with the drastic consequence as a result. However, this is not the only thing
we can say about voluntary / deliberate acts. But before we can go into this
further, we will need to add an epistemic dimension to our stit-framework.
3 The concept of `knowingly doing': E-XSTIT
In this section we extend XSTIT with epistemic operators Kaϕ for knowledge
of individual agents a, resulting in the logic E-XSTIT. This will enable us to
express the concept of `knowingly doing'. Herzig and Troquard were the ﬁrst
to consider the addition of knowledge operators to a stit-logic [22]. Later on
the framework was adapted and extended by Broersen, Herzig and Troquard
[13, 16]. The E-XSTIT of the present section extends earlier versions in several
ways. In particular, three axioms for the interaction of knowledge and action
are proposed. Also the semantics, being two-dimensional, is diﬀerent from the
one in [13]. Finally, the modeled concept is `knowingly doing', whereas in e.g.
[22] the aim is to model `knowing how'. In my opinion these concepts are
diﬀerent. I think `knowing how' should be about whether an agent has a plan
he knows to be eﬀective. This to me seems an intrinsically strategic issue, one
that cannot be approached in a non-strategic stit-setting. Also, `knowing how'
is an epistemic qualiﬁcation concerning an ability, while `knowingly doing' is an
epistemic qualiﬁcation concerning an action.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Given a countable set of propositions P and p ∈ P , and given
a ﬁnite set Ags of agent names, and a ∈ Ags and A ⊆ Ags, the formal language
LE-XSTIT is:
ϕ . . . := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kaϕ | ϕ | [A xstit]ϕ
Deﬁnition 3.2 An E-XSTIT-frame is a tuple 〈S,H,R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}, {∼a|
a ∈ Ags}〉 such that:
• 〈S,H,R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}〉 is an XSTIT-frame
• The ∼a are epistemic equivalence relations over structured worlds such
that:
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 ∼a ◦Ra ⊆∼a ◦RAgs (agents cannot know what choices other agents
perform concurrently)
 RAgs◦ ∼a⊆∼a ◦Ra (agents recall the eﬀects of the actions they know-
ingly perform themselves)
 if 〈h, s〉R〈h′, s′〉 and 〈h, s〉 ∼a 〈h′′, s′′〉 then there is a 〈h′′′, s′′′〉 for
which 〈h′, s′〉R〈h′′′, s′′′〉 and if 〈h′′′, s′′′〉Ra〈h′′′′, s′′′′〉 then 〈h′, s′〉(∼a
◦Ra)〈h′′′′, s′′′′〉 (uniformity of conformant action)
Deﬁnition 3.3 Validity M, 〈s, h〉 |= ϕ, of a formula ϕ in a history/state pair
〈s, h〉 of a model M = 〈S,H,R, {RA | A ⊆ Ags}, {∼a| a ∈ Ags}, pi〉 is deﬁned
as:
All relevant clauses from deﬁnition 2.5, plus:
M, 〈s, h〉 |= Kaϕ ⇔ 〈s, h〉 ∼a 〈s′, h′〉 implies thatM, 〈s′, h′〉 |= ϕ
Satisﬁability, validity on a frame and general validity are deﬁned as usual.
With the above deﬁnitions we can express that agent a knowingly sees to it
that ϕ as Ka[a xstit]ϕ, where we slightly abuse notation by denoting [{a} xstit]ϕ
as [a xstit]ϕ. The semantics is in terms of models with epistemic equivalence
sets (information sets) containing history/state pairs. An agent knowingly does
something if its action `holds' for all the history/state pairs in the epistemic
equivalence set containing the actual history/state pair.
It is important to emphasize that the notion of `knowingly doing' is entirely
diﬀerent from other notions combining knowledge and action or time in the
literature. For instance, if we add epistemic uncertainty relations to temporal
logic or dynamic logics, the choice is usually to deﬁne them over states. In
that case uncertainty, and thus knowledge, cannot concern actions or choices
themselves, but only state-determinate conditions. Only if we let uncertainty
range over history/state pairs, as for the present logic, we can talk about (self-
)knowledge of what agents are actually doing.
Deﬁnition 3.4 The following axiom schemas, in combination with a standard
axiomatization for propositional logic, and the standard rules (like necessitation)
for the normal modal operators, deﬁne a Hilbert system:
All XSTIT axioms determined by deﬁnition 2.6
S5 for each Ka
(Know-X) KaXϕ→ Ka[a xstit]ϕ
(Rec-Eﬀ) Ka[a xstit]ϕ→ XKaϕ
(Unif-Str) ♦Ka[a xstit]ϕ→ Ka♦[a xstit]ϕ
Theorem 3.1 The Hilbert system of deﬁnition 3.4 is complete with respect to
the semantics of deﬁnition 3.3.
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Proof Like for XSTIT, the axioms for E-XSTIT correspond one-to-one to the
semantic conditions, and are in the Sahlqvist class.
Before we elaborate on the interaction properties of E-XSTIT we list some
properties that are derivable as theorems.
Proposition 3.2 The following are theorems in E-XSTIT:
KaXϕ↔ Ka[a xstit]ϕ
KaXϕ→ XKaϕ
The last theorem in the list below is the well known `perfect recall' or `no for-
getting' axiom, known from the literature on the interaction between epistemic
and temporal modalities.
We now discuss each of the knowledge-action interaction properties in the
E-XSTIT-semantics and axiomatization. The ﬁrst one says that epistemic equiv-
alence sets are closed under choices2. The corresponding axiom, is KaXϕ →
Ka[a xstit]ϕ (this property does not hold if the stit-operator is replaced by a de-
liberative stit-oparator). This property ensures that an agent cannot know that
two histories belonging to the same choice are diﬀerent, or, in other words, for
any agent the histories within its own choices are indistinguishable. This means
that agents cannot knowingly do more then what is aﬀected by the choices
they have. In particular, the property KaXϕ → Ka[a xstit]ϕ says that agents
can only know things about the (immediate) future if they are the result of an
action they themselves knowingly perform. Then, an agent unknowingly does
everything that is (1) true for all the history/state pairs belonging to the actual
choice it makes in the actual state, but (2) not true for all the history/state
pairs it considers possible. In general the things an agent does unknowingly
vastly outnumber the things an agent knows it does. For instance, by sending
an email, we may enforce many, many things we are not aware of, which are nev-
ertheless the result of me sending the email. All these things we do unknowingly
by knowingly sending the email.
Another, equivalent way of interpreting the property KaXϕ→ Ka[a xstit]ϕ
is to say that it expresses that agents cannot know what actions other agents
perform concurrently. This is because the independence property (Indep-G)
guarantees that choices of other agents always reﬁne the choices of the agent
we consider. Then, knowing the choice of the other would mean that the agent
would be able to know more about the future state of aﬀairs then is guaranteed
by his own action.
The second constraint on the interaction between knowledge and action is
the one expressed by the axiom Ka[a xstit]ϕ → XKaϕ. The issue here is
that if agents knowingly see to it that a condition holds in the next state, in
that same next state they will recall that the condition holds. Like for the
previous property, of course, I do not want to claim that this is a property that
2An extreme case is where the information sets are exactly the choices in each state. In
that case an agent knows all the consequences of his actions.
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is necessarily true for all systems of agents. Yet it is a property that we can
impose for idealized agents that are not forgetful.
Finally, we discuss the interaction property ♦Ka[a xstit]ϕ → Ka♦[a xstit]ϕ.
It says that if an agent can knowingly see to it that ϕ, then it knows that among
its repertoire of choices there is one ensuring ϕ. This property is the stit-version
of the constraint concerning `uniform strategies' game theorists talk about. In
game theory, uniform strategies require that agents have the same choices in all
states within information sets. Since in game theory the choices are given names,
a constraint is formulated saying that each state within the information set
should have choices of the same type (that is, choices with the same name). In
the present stit-setting, we do not have names. But the intuition that the same
choices should be possible in diﬀerent states of an information set, still applies.
The property ♦Ka[a xstit]ϕ→ Ka♦[a xstit]ϕ exactly captures this intuition. It
says that if an agent has the possibility to knowingly see to it that ϕ, then at
least one of its choices in the states it considers possible actually ensures ϕ (that
is, a ϕ-action is possible in all states of the information set). Maybe it is easier
to see that the negation of the property, that is ♦Ka[a xstit]ϕ∧ K̂a〈a xstit〉¬ϕ
(with K̂a the dual of Ka), is contradictory: it would be absurd if an agent has
the possibility to knowingly see to it that ϕ and at the same time would consider
it an epistemic possibility that it is settled that whatever it does, it allows for
¬ϕ as a possible outcome. Yet another way of phrasing the property is to say
that `true ability' obeys the property of uniformity of strategies.
Now we can go back to formalizing the concepts discussed in the intro-
duction. I explained that the standard deliberative stit captures part of the
`voluntariness' requirements for actus reus. However, voluntariness seems to
involve more than just having had the possibility to do otherwise. Consider the
following example. You carry a very dangerous contagious disease. But you do
not know it. You travel by train and choose to sit next to some person and
thereby unknowingly see to it that he is fatally infected. Now has an actus reus
been committed (assuming spreading fatal diseases is forbidden by law)? The
answer must be no. Even though it is true that you did spread the disease,
and even though you could have done otherwise, what you did will not count as
voluntarily or deliberately spreading the disease, simply because, to a certain
extent, you did not know what you were doing.
So deliberateness or voluntariness entails both the possibility to do otherwise
and having knowledge of what it is one is doing. Even more, an agent should
have knowledge about the side-condition also: if an agent does not know that
it could have done otherwise, we would not call the action deliberate. For
the epistemic position on the side-condition, we then have two possibilities,
motivating two new deﬁnitions for deliberate action:
[a dxstit]′ϕ ≡def Ka[a xstit]ϕ ∧Ka¬Xϕ
[a dxstit]′′ϕ ≡def Ka[a xstit]ϕ ∧ ¬KaXϕ
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The ﬁrst notion says that deliberativeness requires that the agent not only
knowingly performs the action, but also that the agent knows that the result
is not settled, and thus that his action is needed to guarantee the result. The
second notion has a diﬀerent side-condition: the agent only considers it possible
that the result is not settled.
Theorem 3.3 The operators [a dxstit]′ϕ and [a dxstit]′′ϕ are minimal (i.e.,
weak) modal operators, not obeying weakening, or agglomeration, but obeying
D.
Proof Considerations similar to those for theorem 2.4 apply.
By having suggested some deﬁnitions for capturing the voluntariness aspect
of an actus reus, we have actually already touched upon the notion of mens
rea. This is because talking about epistemic aspects of action clearly already
introduces `the mind' as a relevant concept in describing action. But we have
not modeled any deontic aspects yet, and thus at this point we still cannot talk
about the `guilt' aspect of mens rea. Deontic aspects will be the subject of the
next section.
4 Deﬁning deontic modalities
For the extension of our framework with an operator for `ought-to-do', we adapt
the approach taken by Bartha [7] who introduces Anderson style ([3]) violation
constants in stit-theory. The approach with violation constants is very well
suited for theories of ought-to-do, witness the many logics based on adding
violation constants to dynamic logic [25, 10]. However, we believe that the
stit-setting is even more amenable to this approach. Some evidence for this
is found in Bartha's article ([7]), that shows that many deontic logic puzzles
(paradoxes) are representable in an intuitive way. And for the present paper a
clear advantage of deﬁning obligation as a reduction using violation constants,
is that the completeness established for the logics in the previous sections is
preserved after addition of the obligation operator.
Deﬁnition 4.1 V is a violation constant V ∈ P .
Bartha [7] deﬁnes his reduction for `obligation to do' within the classical
instantaneous stit-setting. Here we adapt that to the present situation where
actions only take eﬀect in next states. The intuition behind the deﬁnition is
straightforward: an agent is obliged to do something if and only if by not per-
forming the obliged action, it performs a violation. Since the eﬀect of the obliged
action can only be felt in next states, violations also have to be properties of
next states. Formally, our deﬁnition is given by:
O[a xstit]ϕ ≡def (¬[a xstit]ϕ→ [a xstit]V )
14
Theorem 4.1 The operator O[a xstit]ϕ is KD, that is, it has the same proper-
ties as Standard Deontic Logic [30].
Proof Rewrite (¬[a xstit]ϕ→ [a xstit]V ) as ([a xstit]ϕ ∨ [a xstit]V ). Due to
the propositional constant V , the part [a xstit]V is constant as a whole, which
means that it does not aﬀect the logical properties of the deﬁned modal operator
O[a xstit]ϕ. The necessity operator  is S5, and [a xstit] is KD. Using standard
normal modal logic correspondence theory we conclude that the combined op-
erator [a xstit]ϕ is also KD.
The  operator in the deﬁnition ensures that obligations are `moment de-
terminate'. This means that their validity only depends on the state, and not
on the history (see [23] for a further explanation of this concept). We think that
this is correct. But see [29] for an opposite opinion.
In this section we will not consider the `side conditions' as in the previous
sections. But these could, of course, easily be added to model the `could have
done otherwise' aspect of `deliberateness'. Considering side-conditions would
result in yet other categories.
Note that ¬[a xstit]ϕ expresses that a does not see to it that ϕ, which is
the same as saying that a `allows' a choice for which ¬ϕ is a possible outcome.
The deﬁnition then says that all such choices do guarantee that a violation
occurs. So the agent is liable, because its action bore the risk of a bad outcome.
The above deﬁned obligation is thus a `personal' one. If, by `coincidence', ϕ
occurs, apparently due the action of other agents, while the agent bearing the
obligation did not make a choice that ensured that ϕ would occur, a violation
is guaranteed. So agents do not escape an obligation by having other agents do
the work for them.
We can also make the deﬁnition a little weaker and say that the agent is
only liable if it actually guarantees the bad outcome:
O′[a xstit]ϕ ≡def ([a xstit]¬ϕ→ [a xstit]V )
Theorem 4.2 The operator O′[a xstit]ϕ is a monotonic (i.e., weak) modal logic
obeying the D axiom.
Proof We have to check the properties of the combination 〈a xstit〉ϕ. We
recognize a normal simulation of monotonic modal logic. Since S5 obeys D, the
monotonic simulation inherits D.
Because the above two deﬁnitions do not at all refer to an agent's beliefs or
other mental state, they both capture variants of the mens rea mode of `strict
liability'. For both deﬁnitions it is the case that if there is a violation, the agent
is liable whatsoever, independent of whether or not the agent knows what it is
doing. But, in my opinion this also includes the mens rea mode of `negligently'.
As described in the introduction, this class concerns those cases where `a normal
person' would have realized the consequences of his action. So, again, it does
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not matter what that agent knows about what it is doing, it is liable whatsoever.
The only diﬀerence with the `strict liability' class is that there can be discussion
about what a normal person can foresee, and thus, about whether something
should be strictly liable or not.
Now we turn our attention to the mens rea classes 'knowingly' and `reck-
lessly'. It is clear that to deﬁne these, we can use the concept of `knowingly
doing' as deﬁned in the previous section. We have several options, corresponding
to diﬀerent modes of mens rea. We discuss the following three modes:
OK[a xstit]ϕ ≡def (¬Ka[a xstit]ϕ→ [a xstit]V )
OK ′[a xstit]ϕ ≡def (Ka¬[a xstit]ϕ→ [a xstit]V )
OK ′′[a xstit]ϕ ≡def (Ka[a xstit]¬ϕ→ [a xstit]V )
The ﬁrst operator, that is OK[a xstit]ϕ, captures the mens rea mode of
`recklessly'. Here the agent has to knowingly see to it that ϕ obtains, since
otherwise there will be a violation. In other words, if the agent is reckless, and
does an action that it knows does not exclude an unlawful outcome, it is liable.
The third operator, that is OK ′′[a xstit]ϕ, captures the mens rea mode of
`knowingly'. Here there is only a violation if the agent knowingly sees to it that
the opposite of the lawful outcome ϕ obtains.
Finally, the second operator, that is OK ′[a xstit]ϕ deﬁnes a mode of mens
rea in between `recklessly' and `knowingly'. It says that the agent is liable if it
knowingly refrains from obtaining ϕ. So, on the one hand, there is an aspect of
recklessness: if the agent knowingly omits to do something, a violation occurs,
because omitting may risk an undesirable consequence. On the other hand, if
omitting is seen as a form of doing, we can also say that this expresses that
there is a violation if the agent knowingly `does' the for this level of mens rea
inexcusable omission.
Theorem 4.3 The operator OK[a xstit]ϕ is KD, that is, it has the same proper-
ties as Standard Deontic Logic [30]. The operators OK ′[a xstit]ϕ and OK ′′[a xstit]ϕ
are monotonic (weak) modal operator obeying the D axiom. In particular, the
operators do not obey agglomeration.
Proof For OK[a xstit]ϕ the proof is similar to the one for theorem 4.1. Here
the knowledge modality is extra, which means that we have to investigate the
logical behavior of the combination Ka[a xstit]ϕ, that is, a combination of S5,
S5 and KD. This yields KD. For OK ′[a xstit]ϕ and OK ′′[a xstit]ϕ the proofs are
similar to the one for theorem 4.2
The ﬁnal subject of this section is the principle of "ignorantia juris non
excusat". For all of the above variants, nothing is said about whether or not the
agent actually knows whether or not it has the obligation. But, we can associate
awareness of an obligation directly with awareness of the act of bringing about
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the violation in case of the agent not complying. So we can incorporate the
principle by adapting the previous deﬁnitions as follows:
KOK[a xstit]ϕ ≡def (¬Ka[a xstit]ϕ→ Ka[a xstit]V )
KOK ′[a xstit]ϕ ≡def (Ka¬[a xstit]ϕ→ Ka[a xstit]V )
KOK ′′[a xstit]ϕ ≡def (Ka[a xstit]¬ϕ→ Ka[a xstit]V )
In these deﬁnitions also violations are knowingly brought about. This ex-
presses that the agent bearing the obligation actually knows about the obliga-
tion, that is, the agent will knowingly bring about a violation if it does not
comply with the obligation.
Theorem 4.4 The operator KOK[a xstit]ϕ is KD, that is, it has the same
properties as Standard Deontic Logic [30]. The operators KOK ′[a xstit]ϕ and
KOK ′′[a xstit]ϕ are monotonic (weak) modal operator obeying the D axiom. In
particular, the operators do not obey agglomeration.
Proof No diﬀerence with the properties for theorem 4.3 because the diﬀerence
is only in the constant part of the operator deﬁnitions.
Of course, looking at the formal structure of the above deﬁnitions, a fourth
deﬁnition suggests itself: one where it is not necessary to perform the obliged ac-
tion knowingly, while at the same time, in case of non-compliance, the violation
is brought about knowingly. But it seems clear right away that this combination
is absurd. We cannot knowingly bring about a violation by unknowingly failing
to comply with an obligation.
5 Related work
In [27] a logic is presented whose semantics shares several features with ours.
In particular, the logic has epistemic indistinguishability relations ranging over
history/state pairs. However, actions are omitted. In [26] actions are added to
this framework by using action names in the models and the object language.
So, the authors take a, what we might call `dynamic logic view' on action. The
work focusses on so called `knowledge based obligations'. The central idea is that
when agents get to know more, there are less histories they consider possible,
which in turn may induce that the subset of deontically optimal histories, may
give rise to new obligations. So the phenomenon being studied is that new
knowledge may induce new obligations.
In our setting the phenomenon of getting more obligations by an increase
in knowledge can occur in diﬀerent ways. One way is simply by becoming
aware of an obligation, that is, getting to know that one knowingly performs a
violation by not performing some obliged action. Another route to enabling that
obligations arise as the result of new knowledge, is by adopting the `ought implies
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can' principle for the stronger variants of our obligation operator. If agents get
to know how to do something knowingly, they might incur an obligation that
previously did not apply due to `ought implies can'. This demonstrates that
there seems to be more sides to the problem of `knowledge based obligation'.
Another well-known interaction between epistemic and deontic modalities
is Åqvist's puzzle of `the knower' [4]. If knowledge is modeled using S5 and
obligation using KD (SDL [30]), from OKϕ we derive Oϕ, which is clearly
undesirable in an ought-to-be reading. However, this problem does not arise in
the present logic, because obligation is strictly limited to apply to actions. In
particular, if in Åqvist's example, for ϕ we substitute a stit-action [α xstit]ϕ,
then we can read the derivation as `the obligation to knowingly see to something
implies the obligation to see to that same something'. In the present framework,
that is not an undesirably property, but a desirable property obeyed by our
deﬁnitions, because it is valid that OK[a xstit]ϕ→ O[a xstit]ϕ.
6 Future research
The logics we presented ask for extension in several ways. Note ﬁrst that while
the operators for agency are group operators, the operators for knowledge and
obligation only refer to single agents. Actually, there are many open questions
about how to generalize these operators to group operators. As is well-known,
there are several notions of group-knowledge, such as `shared knowledge', `com-
mon knowledge' and `distributed knowledge'. Which ones combine with which
interaction properties for knowledge and group-action is yet unclear. Likewise
we can consider generalizing the obligation operator to a group operator. Given
the deﬁnitions of section 4 this actually hinges on providing group operators for
the knowledge modalities.
Another issue concerns the violation constants. According to the present
deﬁnitions, they are not relativized to agents or sets of agents. This corresponds
to a `consequentialist's' view on obligation, as in [23], where deontic optimality
is determined according to an ordering of all possible histories. We could also
take the view, like in [24], that deontic optimality orderings should be relative
to agents or groups of agents. For our setting, using violation constants, that
would mean that we introduce a violation constant for each agent or each group.
7 Conclusions
This paper presents an epistemic temporal stit-formalism that is complete with
respect to a two-dimensional Kripke semantics. It introduces the new notion
of `knowingly doing' and discusses some of its possible properties. Using this
notion, new `epistemic' variants of operators for `ought-to-do' are deﬁned. In
particular, many modes of `mens rea' and characteristics of what counts as an
`actus reus', as deﬁned in the juridical literature, can be analyzed and deﬁned
in the framework.
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The ﬁrst general conclusion to be drawn is that our logic framework is very
useful for disambiguating and precisely deﬁning action classes from the juridical
literature. This is exempliﬁed by the fact that in our deﬁnitions a new `natural'
level of mens rea in between `knowingly' and `recklessly' popped up. Further-
more, it is clear that I showed quite some restraint in deﬁning diﬀerent classes;
many more subtle combinations are possible, for instance by demanding `ought
implies can', `side conditions', etc. This suggests that the classiﬁcation from the
juridical literature could be much more subtle and ﬁne-grained than it is, and
the present framework could be of help in deﬁning such a classiﬁcation.
A second conclusion I want to draw is one about deontic logic in general.
Sometimes, in discussions with other logicians, I have to defend deontic logic
against the claim that there is not a single principle of deontic logic that is
non-disputed. To a certain extent that is true. If one aims at designing `the'
logic of deontic reasoning, one is likely to end up with an extremely weak logic,
since for every suggested principle, some deontic logician will raise his hand and
come with a concrete scenario and the claim that this is a counter-example. In
general, my claim would be that such counter-examples often introduce context
that interferes with the pure deontic reasoning. For instance, the present paper
makes very clear that the concept of action itself and the concept of knowledge
may interact with the concept of obligation in many diﬀerent subtle ways, giv-
ing rise to a whole plethora of deﬁnitions for ought-to-do. And then, action
and knowledge are not even the only concepts interfering; there is also time,
intention, etc. Then, what the present paper is also a clear example of is the
phenomenon that if we want to account for all the modalities that interfere
with the pure deontic modalities, and deﬁne deontic modalities acknowledging
the interactions, we get weaker logics. And this mimics closely the complaint
of logicians that there is not a single principle that is not disputed. My reply
is thus, that the lack of logical properties is not inherent to deontic logic. It is
only that deontic modalities often appear to be rather weak because they are
contaminated with other, non-deontic modalities. And one of the tasks of deon-
tic logicians is to expose the contamination, and bring all interfering modalities
to the foreground. In particular, we can view the present work as part of a
greater project in search for the `building blocks' of deontic modalities. And,
the building blocks investigated in this paper are `action' and `knowledge'.
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